In 1978, Simon C. Dik propounded a model of linguistic analysis—Functional Grammar (henceforth FG)—aimed at providing a functional explanation, as opposed to the prevailing formalist one, for linguistic phenomena. Such an explanation implies “the interaction of several different principles, each of which can be understood in terms of either the communicative goals or the psychological constraints involved in verbal interaction” (Dik 1986: 5). In Dik’s view, a functional grammar must analyse the properties of linguistic expressions in the context of their use and connect these properties with the rules and principles which govern verbal interaction. The final goal is to construct a Model of the NLU (M.NLU), capable of accounting for the abilities of speaker and addressee. These abilities form the competence of the NLU at three different levels: cognitive, pragmatic and grammatical. FG, conceived as “a general theory concerning the grammatical organization of natural languages” (Dik 1997a: 2), should be able to reconstruct at least part of these abilities of NLU. Directly related to this functional conception of the organization of natural languages are the standards of adequacy postulated within FG (Dik 1997a: 12–5): (i) Pragmatic adequacy: the theory should account for how people interact in verbal communication; (ii) Psychological adequacy: the theory must be compatible with models which explain the psycholinguistic processes of (de)codification; (iii) Typological adequacy: the theory should be valid for the analysis of any language, accounting for both the differences and the similarities between different languages. Of the three standards of adequacy, the latter has been paid special attention, to the extent that the adoption of the typological method has greatly contributed to the development of the theory. The other two standards have been somewhat neglected, mainly due to the fact that most of the refinements of the theory since its inception have been devoted to the enrichment of the layered structure of the clause, perhaps the most important contribution of FG until the present. There is, however, no doubt that if FG aims at achieving pragmatic and psychological adequacy, an important shift is required from the sentence to the discourse as the object of study. Dik (1997b: 409) points out the need for a discourse grammar in the following terms:

NLUs do not speak in isolated sentences or clauses, but combine these into larger and more complex stretches for which we may use the general cover term “discourse.” A discourse is more (much more) than an arbitrary sequence of clauses. Therefore, even if we had an optimal theory of the clause, this theory would still leave much to be desired when considered as a component in a wider theory of NLU’s communicative competence. Moreover, since clauses, in their internal structure, are sensitive to a variety of discourse factors, an “optimal” theory of the (isolated) clause is simply impossible.

It follows that the theory of FG, if it is to live up to its self-imposed standards of adequacy, should in the long run account for the functional grammar of discourse.

1. For a critical assessment of FG in compliance with the standards of adequacy, see Butler (1999).
Since the beginning of the nineties, especially after the 6th International Conference
on Functional Grammar held in York in 1994, there has been a growing interest in
developing FG from a sentence grammar into a grammar of discourse. Hannay and
Bolkestein (1998) have grouped the different attempts into two different approaches—the
upward layering approach and the modular approach. The upward layering approach
(Hengeveld 1997; Moutauouakil 1998, among others) accounts for the analysis of discourse
by adding a higher level—rhetorical level—to the existing hierarchical structure of the
clause. The modular approach (Gómez Soliño 1996; Kroon 1997; Bolkestein 1998; Vet 1998;
Siewierska 1998; Pérez Hernández and Ruiz de Mendoza 2001, among others) is charac-
terized by the introduction of separate modules for the grammatical and the pragmatic
domains. The debate held inside the FG community in the last years about the
appropriateness of these two alternative approaches to handle the complexity of discourse
led Hengeveld to devise a new architecture for Functional Grammar, known as Functional
Discourse Grammar (hereafter FDG).

The present book constitutes both a presentation and a critical assessment of FDG as
a model capable of accounting for the use of language in discourse. The volume is
organized into fourteen chapters, preceded by a preface by the editors and a list of
abbreviations. The first chapter by Hengeveld, in which the FDG model is presented,
constitutes the key article to which different authors react (chapters 2–13). The book closes
with an epilogue by Hengeveld, in which he refines the model after having taken into
consideration the different reactions raised in the previous chapters. An index of names
and an index of subjects round out this volume.

In the first chapter, Hengeveld outlines the main organization of FDG. The main point
of departure from standard FG is the adoption of a top–down organization, more in line
with the criterion of psychological adequacy, according to which the starting point is not
the selection of a predicate from the lexicon as it was maintained by FG’s bottom-up
approach, but the speaker’s intention to communicate. According to this author, this new
model integrates the two approaches mentioned above. FDG is thus modular, since three
interacting levels conceived as separate modules (interpersonal level, representational level
and expression level) are distinguished, and hierarchical, since different layers are recognized
at each of the different levels. Within the grammatical component, mapping rules link the
interpersonal to the representational level, in those cases in which communication implies
semantic content, whereas expression rules link the interpersonal and representational levels
to the expression level, or the interpersonal level directly to the expression level in those
cases in which only pragmatic content is transmitted. Apart from the grammatical
component, two other components, which interact with the three levels, are distinguished:
a cognitive component, which contains the long-term knowledge of the speaker, and a
communicative component, which contains the short-term information derivable from the
co(n)text. Each of the three levels of the grammatical component is organized
hierarchically. The hierarchical organization of the interpersonal level constitutes the main
point of departure from FG’s layered structure. The inclusion of the communicated
content, the ascriptive act and the referential act under the abstract illocutionary frame
allows for a systematic distinction between the entity type and the communicative
functions of reference and ascription. Another innovation of Hengeveld’s proposal is the
introduction of the expression level motivated by the existence of meta-linguistic
expressions and reflexive language.
The remaining chapters, except the last one, offer different contributors’ reactions to Hengeveld’s model. The most global assessment of FDG is carried out by Anstey, who evaluates Hengeveld’s proposal in terms of his contribution both to the theory of FG and to the FG community. Anstey presents a critical, in-depth description of the evolution of FG from its inception to the present in order to be able to better appreciate Hengeveld’s contribution. He analyses seven problems that have been a constant for FG and considers the extent to which FDG offers solutions to those problems. Whereas some of the problems are addressed, although not always satisfactorily, by the new model, others are not even taken into consideration. Anstey concludes that “addressing perennial problems concerning the theory’s foundations may offer more fruitful resources for development” (55). The other chapters in this book concentrate on specific aspects of the model proposed by Hengeveld, namely: (i) the cognitive component; (ii) the communicative component; (iii) the applicability of the top-down layering model; (iv) the interpretation of “discourse” either as process or as product.

The cognitive component of FDG is the main concern of the chapter by Inchaurralde. From a cognitive perspective, this author evaluates the psychological adequacy of Hengeveld’s proposal. He claims that with the incorporation of the cognitive component to the theory some linguistic phenomena which are cognitively motivated can be satisfactorily handled. However, he considers that the configuration of this component is still too abstract to be highly operative, since, on the one hand, it is placed outside the core of the model without a clear indication of the way it influences the three levels and, on the other, it includes information of a quite different nature. Inchaurralde claims that a distinction should be made between the speaker’s knowledge of the world and his linguistic competence. Nevertheless, he is aware of the fact that “giving a very detailed account of its [cognition] internal workings would go beyond the scope of this grammatical approach and would lead us into matters of a fully psychological import” (84).

The communicative component of the model is Connolly’s main concern. He proposes a framework for the representation of discourse which is compatible with FDG. This framework results from a compromise between trying to represent the wide variety of discourse phenomena, which he describes in detail in his paper, and doing it in terms of a readable notation. He claims that a separate level—the contextual level—should be distinguished. This level, which is not part of language itself, is essential for the description of discourse, since it allows us to represent the different dimensions of discourse (temporal sequence, hierarchical structure, different levels of analysis as well as relational phenomena).

Two of the chapters in the book address the adequacy of the new top-down organization for the analysis of specific linguistic phenomena. Cornish evaluates the extent to which Hengeveld’s model gives solutions to the problems concerning the assignment of Topic and Focus pragmatic functions. He claims that pragmatic function assignment falls within the interpersonal level since it should take place before the semantic and syntactic properties of the linguistic expression are specified. In his paper, Cornish compares FDG with another functional theory—the Columbia School of Linguistics—pointing out what each of the theories has to offer to the analysis of pragmatic functions. Verstraete discusses modality, a recurrent but still unresolved topic in FG, in the light of the new modular, top-down model. He argues that this new architecture constitutes a better framework for the treatment of modality, since it allows us to analyse deontic
modality not only as an objective category but also as a subjective one, in parallel with the traditional subjective-objective distinction recognized in the domain of epistemic modality. However, a further refinement of the theory is suggested in the sense that a certain degree of optionality of the layers at the representational level should be accepted within the model.

One of the most controversial issues raised by Hengeveld’s new model for the analysis of discourse concerns precisely the very nature of the object of study. Is FDG to be considered a model for the representation of linguistic units (“discourse” = product or pattern) or of the communicative process (“discourse” = process)? The answers to this question provided by the different authors in this book can be grouped according to three main positions: (i) from a functional perspective, discourse should be interpreted as a communicative, interactive process; (ii) the task of the linguist is to account for the linguistic units (pattern) put to use in the communicative process; (iii) the two sides of discourse should be seen as complementary rather than exclusive.

Many of the papers collected in this volume defend the first position. Mackenzie presents an alternative to Hengeveld’s proposal—Incremental Functional Grammar (IFG)—characterized by a reinterpretation of the interpersonal and expression levels that accounts for real-time processes. He claims that in order to achieve psychological adequacy, the theory should come closer to a production model. In doing so “we can see discourse production as a dynamic process occurring in real time and the expression of the clause as a similarly real-time process” (182). A similar position is shared by Gómez-González, who considers Hengeveld’s distinction between cognition and communicative context counterintuitive. She posits a new model—Incremental Discourse Cognitive Grammar (IDCG)—capable of accounting for “the connection between discourse expressions and cognition as a dynamic real-time process in which information is incrementally presented in coherent ‘packets’ of digestible size” (215). Starting as a functional grammarian, Nuyts (1992; 2001) departed soon from standard FG following the conviction that, in order to be pragmatically and psychologically adequate, a functional theory should show a more radical cognitive and procedural orientation. His model, known as Functional Procedural Grammar (FPG), analyses the procedures involved in producing linguistic expressions, rather than the linguistic material available. He establishes a clear-cut distinction between the conceptual and the linguistic representation, since conceptualization must be conceived as non-linguistic. The layered system is thus not attributed to grammar but to cognition. He claims that functional models, such as FDG, “overburden” the grammar by including in it aspects that belong to the area of cognition. Interpreting FDG as a production, dynamic model, Bakker and Siewierska concentrate on the expression level. They analyse the implications of Hengeveld’s proposal for the expression rules conceived as a dynamic (top-down, left-to-right) rather than a static model. They consider that certain refinements to FDG are necessary in order to provide a full psychological model of the speaker. Such a model will be compatible with their dynamic interpretation of expression rules, thus giving rise to “one dynamic model of a discourse-oriented FG of the speaker” (357).

The second position is illustrated in this volume by Moutaouakil. He defines discourse

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2. See Bakker (2001) and Bakker and Siewierska (2002) for a detailed explanation of this dynamic approach to expression rules.
as “any ‘complete communicative unit,’ i.e. any utterance fulfilling a communicative purpose in a given setting or, in other words, any utterance with both a content and a communicative intention” (300). This author puts forward a universal abstract Archetypal Discourse Structure (ADS) which is actualized in any of the four formal categories distinguished (text, clause, text-phrase and word) according to certain parameters.

Fortescue directly addresses the problem of interpreting FDG as a static system of choices or as a dynamic process model. He suggests that the best solution is to consider these two interpretations as complementary, since both are needed in order to account for certain linguistic phenomena that belong both to process and pattern. The same position is shared by Harder who, in spite of the problems he still finds in Hengeveld’s model, acknowledges the potential of this new model for the integration of discourse and grammar, even at the expense of a certain amount of duplicated information.

The last chapter presents Hengeveld’s reactions to the contributions made in the previous chapters. Of the different aspects he takes into consideration, two are of great importance for the final configuration of FDG. In relation to the interpretation of ‘discourse,’ he clearly states that FDG is a model that represents linguistic facts and, therefore, is not conceived as a model of the speaker although “the patterns of language are described as reflecting the process of communication” (366). After assessing the different suggestions made, he presents a re-elaboration of the model, which is now placed within a wider model of verbal interaction. The revised model consists of four components: the conceptual component (previously cognitive component), the grammatical component (which comprises the interpersonal, representational and the newly incorporated structural level), the contextual component (previously communicative component) and the acoustic component (which includes the expression level).

The main conclusion to be drawn is that at this stage “FDG is a research programme rather than a fully-fledged theory” (364). The collection of papers in this volume is clearly illustrative of the debate that is currently taking place within the FG community in an attempt to expand FG from a sentence grammar into a discourse grammar. It seems, however, that we are working in the right direction, as was attested at the 11th International Conference on Functional Grammar held in Gijón in September 2004.

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The opening chapter, by Kees Hengeveld, sets out in programmatic form a new architecture for FG which both preserves the best of the traditional model and offers a place for numerous recent insights. The remaining chapters are devoted to refining and developing the programme laid down by Hengeveld, bringing in data from a range of languages as well as theoretical insights inspired by adjoining frameworks.