Demographic Change and Conflict in Contemporary Africa

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Abstract:
Sub-Saharan Africa has gone from having a very low population density and negative population growth in the 19th century to an extremely high population growth today. While some political demographers have linked the continent’s high population growth rate to current conflict and civil wars, I argue here that a more important cause of contemporary conflict has been this rapid demographic shift over the past century and a half. Specifically, I show that low population density contributed to poverty, communal and unequal property rights, and high levels of ethnic diversity in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, which have combined with recent high population growth rates to produce large amounts of “sons of the soil” conflict over land in contemporary Africa. I demonstrate the validity of my argument with reference to contemporary civil wars in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Word Count: 5992 (excluding abstract and acknowledgments)

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1 I thank the Harvard University conference participants along with seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Gareth Austin, Tim Dyson and Sean Fox for many useful suggestions. All errors are of course my own.
Perhaps the most important thing to understand when comparing African societies to those of other regions of the world is that historically speaking, the continent has the lowest population density of any of the major continents. This crucial fact has shaped all aspects of African life (Collins & Burns, 2007, p. 40).

1. Introduction

The politics of population growth in contemporary Africa has largely been a neglected topic. While there is growing interest in the long-term causes and consequences of Africa’s historical low population density (Austin, 2008; Herbst, 2000; Nunn, 2008), there remains relatively little interest in assessing the political consequences of demographic change in contemporary Africa. My goal here is thus to assess these consequences, especially in relation to issues of conflict and violence.

The literature on conflict and demography has long moved away from a simple Malthusian model whereby high population density leads directly to violence. Rather, as suggested variously by such authors as (Goldstone, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006), high population growth can lead to violence only indirectly through such mechanisms as rigid political institutions, the high salience of group cleavages, unequal access to resources and the lack of institutional inclusivity, among other factors. However, the analysis of these mechanisms have largely remained at the non-geographical level, with little attention to why or how population growth might affect some parts of the world more than others.

In this chapter I focus on the link between conflict and demographic change in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that historically low population densities in Africa have indirectly provided the opportunities, motives and collective action necessary for conflict via poverty, inefficient land-holding structures and ethnic diversity, respectively. More specifically, I claim that recent population growth has combined with these three variables to produce a specific type of conflict, namely “sons of the soil” conflict over land. The preponderance of this type of conflict across Africa can thus can be traced to a large and, by world historical standards, a very quick shift from low population densities to high population growth over the past century and a half.

The chapter is structured as follows. First I explain how Africa’s historic low population densities have resulted in poverty, communal and unequal land-holding structures, and ethnic diversity. Second, I detail how modern high population growth has impacted African states negatively through these three processes, giving examples from Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally I conclude with some wider thoughts on political demography in Africa.

2. The Consequences of Low Population Density in Modern Africa

Debates have raged among historians as to the causes of Africa’s low population density: while some have suggested that Africa was sparsely populated due to “ancient rocks, poor soils, fickle rainfall, abundant insects and unique prevalence of disease” (Iliffe, 2007, p. 1), others have placed more emphasis on the role of the intercontinental slave trade in extracting people from the continent (Nunn, 2008; Zuberi, Sibanda, Bawah, & Noumbissi, 2003). Regardless of the causes, there is almost universal agreement that pre-colonial Africa’s population density was low and, due to large population growth elsewhere, sharply decreasing relative to other regions by the beginning of the colonial period in the late 19th century. The political and economic consequences of low population density have not, however, drawn as
much attention. Here I focus on three major consequences for pre-colonial and colonial Africa, namely poverty, a communal and unequal property rights system, and ethnic diversity, each of which I examine in order.

2.1. Poverty

There is good evidence that Africa’s low population density has posed an impediment to economic development in at least three ways. First, economists and historians have long emphasized how Africa’s high land/labor ratio has led to high labor costs and a subsequent reliance upon labor-saving, land-extensive agriculture (Austin, 2008). As a result there were few incentives to increase agricultural productivity, while widely dispersed farms were difficult to link together with transport infrastructure (Herbst, 2000).

Second, a scarcity of labor also meant that slave raiding arose before the arrival of the Europeans, thus aiding the development of the intercontinental slave trade (Iliffe, 2007). The effects of the slave trade were economically pernicious in many ways. Not only did it “remove labor from a labor-scarce continent, the opposite of what the economies required for long-term growth” (Austin, 2008, p. 613), but it also weakened state development, with an increasing effect after independence (Nunn, 2008). Moreover, ethnic fractionalization, whose negative effects on economic development have been widely discussed (Easterly & Levine, 1997), has a positive relationship with historic slave exports, suggesting that the slave trade “impeded the formation of broader ethnic identities” (Nunn, 2008, p. 164).

Third, a low population density put Africans at a severe disadvantage in resisting the onslaught of European imperialism, whose links with economic underdevelopment in Africa are now well established in the literature (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). Many scholars have noted the remarkable speed with which Europeans conquered the continent, which was in part due to the continent’s low population density. Thus, given a choice between resisting colonization and escaping to open land away from colonial domination, most Africans naturally chose the latter option (Herbst, 2000). Indeed, the most prominent example of African resistance to imperialism, namely the Ethiopian defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896, was in large part a consequence of Emperor Menelik’s ability to draw upon an army of 100,000 soldiers compared to less than 20,000 for the Italians (Iliffe, 2007, p. 171). What made Ethiopia different in this regard was her highlands, which across Africa contain 4% of total land mass but almost 20% of its population, and which allowed for a great abundance of population in central and northern Ethiopia (McCann, 1995, pp. 23, 89).

2.2. Communal and Unequal Land Rights

As already noted, low population density meant that labor was much scarcer a commodity than land in pre-colonial Africa, which explains why the concept of private property was often absent while laws regulating labor, marriage and cattle-ownership were regularly highly detailed and intricate. Far from being inefficient at the time, economists like (Binswanger & Deininger, 1997) have suggested that this lack of land ownership rights was not problematic in that the benefits of private property were outweighed by their enforcement costs. In their subsequent attempts at codifying customary laws according to individual “tribes,” European colonizers created systems of land tenure that was dually problematic. First, attempts at
designating customary law by tribe rather than by country meant that each colonial state had multiple and overlapping systems of land tenure. Precisely because land rights were largely uncodified in pre-colonial times, these property laws were contradictory and ever-changing according to new interpretations of what constituted African custom. Thus, despite some weak efforts at land reform, today some 80% of all land across Africa remains in customary tenureship (Boone, 2007b).

The second problem caused by the codification of customary land law was the way colonialists vested these customary land rights in tribal chiefs and thereby created local “decentralized despots” across rural Africa (Mamdani, 1996). These chiefs, whose power over their subjects was enhanced by colonial restrictions on labor movement outside Africans’ designated tribal territories, suddenly found themselves in charge of vast amounts of land and were thus able to gradually acquire control over large tracts of land. Moreover, colonial rulers allowed non-Africans to take up ownership of supposedly “ownerless” land, both as settlers and investors. The consequence of allocating land to both tribal chiefs and non-Africans, while beneficial to colonialists, was to create a highly unequal system of property rights ownership.

2.3. Ethnic Diversity

Africa is widely known for its high levels of ethnic diversity (Easterly & Levine, 1997), and there is a good deal of evidence that low population density has been a significant cause of this diversity, either indirectly or directly. As regards the former, we have already seen that low population density led to an inability to resist colonialism, and there is evidence that colonialism itself contributed to higher levels of ethnic diversity. For instance, in colonial Ghana “missionary and colonial policies, by providing educational and administrative benefits based on tribal boundaries, gave incentives for local chiefs to emphasize linguistic differences from their neighbors” (Laitin, 1994, p. 623). It is thus not surprising that (Michalopoulos, 2008) finds a positive and significant relationship between British, French, German and Portuguese colonization and ethnolinguistic fractionalization for a world-wide sample of countries.

There is also evidence for a direct link between low population density and ethnic diversity. Africa’s ethnic diversity may have even been greater in the pre-colonial period, inasmuch as many missionaries “reduced Africa’s innumerable dialects to fewer written languages” due to budgetary constraints (Iliffe, 2007, p. 239). (Moore et al., 2002) have suggested that cultural and biological diversity are correlated, inasmuch as areas which support highly diverse ecological environments do not create the incentives for local inhabitants to establish the large trading networks that can lead to the creation of larger ethnolinguistic groups. In other words, biological diversity could be responsible for both cultural diversity but also the aforementioned abundance of disease that contributed to low population densities in most of Africa. This proposition has also found empirical validation by (Michalopoulos, 2008), who shows that pre-colonial population density is inversely and significantly related to ethnic fractionalization, even with continental dummies and other controls.

3. Africa Under High Population Growth

The low population density which did so much to contribute to poverty, inefficient land rights and ethnic diversity has not, however, been a constant factor
throughout African history. As noted in Tables 1 and 2, Sub-Saharan Africa had a larger population than Europe between the 14th and 18th centuries. After experiencing negative population growth between 1600 and 1900 – the only region in the world to do so over this period – since 1900 Africa has suddenly experienced one of the largest growth spurts ever recorded in human history.

[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]

The cause for this shift are simple: Africa is the last region of the world to enter the demographic transition, whereby societies move from a high birth/high death equilibrium to a low birth/lower death equilibrium via a high birth/lower death transition phase. It is this intermediate period which produces high population growth, via both high fertility and low morality. What is remarkable about the transition in Africa is that the continent is experiencing large increases in population despite the fact that, thanks to war, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, mortality still remains relatively high compared to other parts of the world.

The evidence suggests that, in part due to the political stability and western medicine introduced by colonialism after World War I (Clapham, 2006), African fertility and population growth rates rose for decades to peak in 1983 and 1990, respectively (Iliffe, 2007). Yet, at 41.7 births per annum per 1000 people, African birth rates remain at almost twice that of the next highest region (Latin America, 23.1 births), and its average fertility rate, while in decline, is not converging with the rest of the world (Zuberi et al., 2003). This extraordinary quick shift from negative population growth in the early 19th century to a peak of around 3% a year in the late 20th century has given Africans very little time to adjust to the very different political, economic and social conditions brought by rapid population growth.

One result of this sudden change has been a high level of civil strife, specifically “sons of the soil” conflict over land between migrants and natives. While this type of conflict has received a growing amount of attention from scholars (Bates, 2008; Boone, 2007a; Dunn, 2009; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2006), with the exception of (Green, 2007) no one has attempted to explain its origins through a political demography framework. Thus I now return to the three outcomes of low population density outlined above and how they have interacted with high population growth in the post-colonial era.

3.1. Poverty

Not surprisingly, political economists have long suggested that poverty and economic decline can lead to conflict, especially in Africa. More specifically, (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) argue that poverty inhibits governments from developing their militaries and suppressing insurgencies, while (Collier, 2006) suggests that poverty decreases the opportunity costs for rebellion compared with nonviolent activities. The relationship between poverty, population growth and conflict is also well established. (Goldstone, 2002) shows that the combination of rising urbanization, a good proxy for rural population pressure, and low levels of GDP/capita lead to an increased propensity for conflict. More specifically, high-fertility countries in the initial phase of the demographic transition often see a “youth bulge” of 15-24-year-olds, who are already easier to mobilize politically due to fewer responsibilities and openness to new ideas. When youth bulges coincide with low
economic growth, thereby leading to under- and unemployment, this combination can have a strong link with civil wars (Keen, 2005; Urdal, 2006).

3.2. Land Rights

As noted above, upon independence African states had land tenure systems that were largely communal, with very unequal distribution of what small amount of private property did exist. As regards communal land, most post-independence regimes nationalized communal land ownership, with some states like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia going so far as to nationalize private land as well. Moreover, the nationalization of public land only exacerbated inequalities in private land ownership inasmuch as it allowed politically powerful Africans to acquire and expand their land holdings. Yet at the same time that states were nationalizing land ownership, population density in some regions had grown to the point where many rural Africans could not longer access enough land in their “tribal” areas. Efforts that had previously focused on expanding the amount of land under cultivation, which was easy with low population densities, had thus run their course by the 1980s in such places as Niger (Raynaut, 1988). As a result, rural-rural migration became an increasingly viable option, especially to other regions which had lower population densities and good quality farmland. Thus labor migrants who had the ear of the government could access nationalized land in new areas, and, as these labor migrants generally came from areas which were more developed than those to which they migrated, resentment and sometimes rebellion developed amongst the indigenous population, leading to “sons of the soil” conflict.

3.3. Ethnic Diversity

There has been a vast literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict, especially since the 1990s. (Easterly & Levine, 1997, p. 1223), for instance, argue that ethnic diversity, as measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, “is a meaningful predictor of the potential for ethnic conflict as measured by its worst possible manifestations,” namely civil war and genocide. Moreover, the evidence from literature on “sons of the soil” conflict shows a greater propensity for violence when “natives” and “settlers” are from different ethnic groups. Thus, what dampens this type of conflict in more homogenous countries elsewhere is what also exacerbates it in ethnically diverse regions like Africa (Kahl, 2006). Moreover, the absence of cross-cutting cleavages group, as exist in India, have helped to accentuate ethnic differences in Africa. Indeed, not only do ethnic differences make the demarcation between settlers and natives easy but they also allow for easier collective action among the natives, who are usually the instigators of “sons of the soil” conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). A growing literature thus suggests that ethnicity can provide the resources for collective action, specifically through the existence of ethnic norms and institutions that enforce cooperative behavior (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007).

4. Empirical Analysis

The above analysis shows how low population density can indirectly provide the opportunities, motives and collective action necessary for rural conflict over land. First, poverty lowers the opportunity cost to engage in violence while also raising the
value of land relative to other resources. Second, the unequal distribution of private land and the nationalization of public land creates a motive to gain control over land for the purposes of redistribution. Third and finally, ethnic diversity helps to provide for collective action among groups who are already primed for violence. Table 3 summarizes this causal story.

[Insert Table 3 here]

In order to test this theory empirically I focus here on two prominent contemporary case studies, namely the Sudanese civil war in Darfur since 2002 and the civil war in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1996. Both wars are obviously very complex in origin and I make no pretence here to examine all explanations for their outbreaks, which in both cases had much to do with external factors, individual agency and a variety of other factors. Rather, my goal here is merely to demonstrate that both conflicts can both be explained by my political demography theory.

4.1. Civil War in Darfur, Sudan

In the pre-colonial era Sudan had very low population densities; thus, with large amounts of available land, farmers such as the Masalit of Darfur in western Sudan ‘would farm an area of land until productivity declined and then move on to establish a new community’ (Bilsborrow & DeLargy, 1990, p. 140). This low population density also contributed to the use of slavery in pre-colonial Sudan, whereby northern Sudanese would raid the South for slaves whom they would bring north to work as agricultural laborers or soldiers. In particular Darfur lay at the heart of one of the major Trans-Saharan slave routes, whereby African slaves were exported to Egypt and beyond. Moreover, as elsewhere low population densities contributed to Sudan’s “enormous ethnic and linguistic diversity” (Collins, 2008, p. 8), whose complexity has been the subject for numerous studies.

In the colonial period the British colonialists instituted an indirect tribal administration in Darfur, where each *dar* (province) was “an ethnic territory in which the dominant group had legal jurisdiction” (De Waal, 2005, p. 193). More specifically, this system meant that land was communally administered by local paramount chiefs, who would allocate land rights to their ethnic brethren. Low population densities for most of the 20th century meant that in Darfur “there was sufficient free land” such that a “very substantial settler population” from northern Sudan could move into the area through the 1970s without any problems (De Waal, 2005, p. 193).

At the same time a variety of economic and political factors encouraged more migration into the area and hardened differences between natives and migrants. First, President Gaafar Nimeiry’s government nationalized 99% of land in Sudan in 1970, thereby leading to growing inequalities in land ownership as politicians, soldiers and bureaucrats acquired land at the expense of the politically powerless. Second, Nimeiry attempted to build Sudan into the “Breadbasket of the Middle East” by acquiring large tracts of land for mechanized agriculture in the 1970s. While successful in the short term, this policy had more serious longer-term consequences of promoting even more land infertility, displacing farmers and pastoralists from their land and adding to the country’s growing problems with external debt and inflation. The resultant economic collapse of the late 1970s was only exacerbated by a
structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and several years of drought, leading to chronic food shortages and the outbreak of famine in Darfur in the early 1980s (Bilsborrow & DeLargy, 1990; Collins, 2008). Third, Nimeiry’s government centralized local government power in its Regional Government Act of 1980, thereby taking away power from the former tribal chiefs who had previously prevented internal migration and giving it to increasingly Islamist cadres allied with Khartoum (Manger, 2006). For these multiple reasons nomadic migrants from northern Sudan and Chad flowed into parts of Darfur previously dominated by farmers, leading Darfur’s population to increase from 1.1 million in 1956 to 6.5 million in 2003, or an annual growth rate of 4.0%. Moreover, increasing desertification pushed up population densities on arable land even higher, with farmers responding by expanding the size of their plots to compensate for the decreased rainfall and an increased population (Fadul, 2006). These patterns thus led to the closure of many nomadic migratory routes and increasing conflict between pastoralists and farmers.

Simultaneously an increase in Arab supremacism in Sudan and the region led to an increased emphasis on “Africanism” by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) rebel leader John Garang and other supporters of a “new Sudan” not dominated by Arabs. This increasing polarization thus helped to promote ethnic/racial differences between “Arabs” and “Africans” in Darfur despite the fact that these differences had little to no historic basis in Darfur. As such many Fur “started to talk about Darfur ‘being for the Fur,’ and that the Arabs were foreigners who should leave” (Manger, 2006, p. 19).

The various clashes between various migrant and native groups that had started in the 1970s continued through the famine and beyond a brief Arab-Fur conflict in the late 1980s. Increasing efforts at Arabization in the region inevitably led to the formation of the Sudanese Liberation Movement among the Fur and other non-Arab Darfuris, whose leaders deliberately copied their name from the SPLM of southern Sudan. In response in 2003 the Khartoum government armed local and Chadian immigrant Arab militias, the janjawid, who themselves were largely unemployed youth (Mamdani, 2009). Thereafter the conflict quickly spiraled out of control, with internal ethnic divisions within the SLM only further halting cease-fire efforts.

4.2. Civil War in the Eastern DRC

In the eastern DRC, as elsewhere in Africa, pre-colonial population densities were low enough that the private alienation of land was largely non-existent and migration could take place without any serious land pressures. Moreover, the region was a site for slave traders from both Zanzibar (to the east) and the Kingdom of Kongo (to the west). As a result the region became ethnically diverse due to various waves of migration and different understandings of ethnicity; indicative in this regard were confused understandings over whether President Mobutu was ethnically Ngbandi, Mongo, Ngala or even “Sudanic” or “Bantu” (Young, 1976, pp. 194-195).

In the colonial period the Belgian government codified customary land laws but only for land “already under the practical control of traditional authorities,” with all other land henceforth declared property of the colonial state, with the goal of using these vast amounts of virgin land for plantations and wildlife parks (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005, p. 126). Due in part to the mass deaths of Congolese under early Belgian colonial rule and decreasing fertility levels, the Belgians encouraged
Rwandan migration to the DRC after acquiring Rwanda from the Germans after World War I. While the Rwandans were welcomed by plantation owners, they were viewed as foreigners by local Congolese despite the fact that many Kinyarwanda speakers had lived in the DRC before colonialism. Thus Belgian attempts at creating a Banyarwanda (ethnic Rwandan) chiefdom in the North Kivu province failed due to local opposition, leading Rwandan migrants to purchase local land instead.

The eastern provinces were already a site of high population density relative to other parts of the DRC due to high fertility rates and high quality soil that drew migrants. By the 1950s fertility rates had stopped growing in the Kivus but started to sharply increase elsewhere; as a result after 1950 population growth across the DRC took off at over 3.0% per year and was accompanied by increasing urbanization and the clearing of new lands in rural areas (Romaniuk, 1980; Shapiro, 1995). In particular the “unrelenting population growth” in eastern DRC led to the usual consequences of a growing group of migrant and landless laborers (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005, p. 138).

After independence President Mobutu echoed other African rulers with his 1973 land law, which abolished customary land and declared all land the property of the state. Henceforth those Congolese who had been able to access education during the colonial period and thereafter gain favor in Kinshasa, which included the Banyarwanda in North and South Kivu provinces and the Hema in Ituri province, were thus able to take advantage of these land laws to allocate themselves land (Pottier, 2006; Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005). Thus already by the early 1980s there was evidence of “resentment against ‘intruders’” in the Kivus, where a local judge claimed “he [would] do everything to ensure that ancestral land does not pass into ‘foreign’ hands” (MacGaffey, 1982, pp. 102-103). Yet simultaneously the Congolese economy started to collapse, with an increased acceleration after 1990 as the end of the Cold War led to both a drop in US aid to Mobutu’s government and to the abandonment of the International Coffee Agreement which had previously helped to secure good prices for local coffee growers. In 1996 Laurent Kabila thus launched his rebellion that overthrew Mobutu’s regime in 1997 and led to “sons of the soil” conflict in both the Kivus and Ituri province, which we examine briefly in turn.

Previously the Kivus were the site of the colonial plantations and Rwandan immigration discussed above. Due in part to ongoing post-colonial migration from Rwanda and Burundi, population growth in Kivus was thus even higher than other parts of the DRC at more than 4.0% annually between 1948 and 1970, compared to a Congolese-wide growth rate of 2.6% over the same time period (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005). Combined with increasing Banyarwanda purchases of the former colonial plantations after 1973 and the DRC’s economic collapse, this growth meant increasing inequalities in land ownership. As a result local politicians from non-Banyarwanda ethnic groups initiated violence against the Banyarwanda in 1993; a subsequent ceasefire was forged only to be broken by the influx of more than one million Rwandan refugees the next year as a result of the Rwandan genocide. The genocide thus heightened ethnic differences between non-Banyarwanda on the one hand and Banyarwanda and their ethnic Banyamulenge brethren in South Kivu on the other, leading the former to accuse the latter of being “foreign” or allochtone. This split manifested itself violently between different rebel factions, with the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge initially represented by the Rally for Congolese Democracy, while the non-Banyarwanda were supported by the Congolese government and Mai Mai rebels; all groups contributed greatly to the civil war and post-war violence in the eastern DRC.
Ituri province, located north of the Kivus on the Ugandan/Congolese border, is 
split demographically between Hema pastoralists and Lendu farmers, with the latter 
claiming to be more indigenous to the region than the former. As noted above, due to 
political connections with Kinshasa many local Hema had acquired land after 1973, 
and continued to do so through the 1990s when Hema landowners started expelling 
Lendu squatters, leading prominent Lendu to organize into self-defense groups. The 
resulting violence was only exacerbated by the Hema-dominated rebel movement 
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), whose leaders talked of Hema originaires and 
Lendu non-originaires or “visitors” on local radio stations in tones worryingly 
reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide (Pottier, 2006). The conflict quickly spiraled 
out of control, with Ugandan and Rwandan intervention contributing to the conflict 
before UPC leader Thomas Lubanga was arrested by the International Criminal Court 
in 2006.

5. Conclusions

In this chapter I have argued that Africa’s historical low population density 
left it with a legacy of poverty, communal and unequal property rights and an 
ethnically diverse population upon independence. High population growth since the 
mid-20th century has interacted with these three legacies and produced large amounts 
of rural “sons of the soil” conflict over land. The examples of civil wars in 
contemporary Sudan and the DRC gave empirical evidence for this argument.

As with other recent scholarship, the chapter thus suggests that a neo-
Malthusian direct relationship between demography and conflict is implausible. 
However, it also suggests that the general neglect of demographic factors by many 
scholars has not been helpful in furthering our understanding of African conflict. As 
such, four obvious policy suggestions present themselves. First, fertility decline 
should be an obvious target, inasmuch as high fertility has encouraged rural-rural 
migration. Second, a focus on rural economic growth would help to alleviate rural 
poverty and address Africa’s ongoing rural/urban gap. Third, the redistribution of 
land rights towards cultivators and away from landlords and the state could alleviate 
much rural conflict as well as spur economic growth, although good land reform is 
obviously much easier said than done. Fourth and finally, it may be possible for 
politicians to make ethnic diversity less politically salient through various nation 
building policies, as perhaps took place in Nyerere’s Tanzania (Miguel, 2004).

Further research into this area is obviously important to refine the conclusions 
presented here. Certainly more analysis of the causes and consequences of internal, 
rural-rural migration is badly needed, especially considering its general neglect in the 
social sciences relative to urbanization and international migration. The relationship 
between population density, population growth and economic growth could be more 
refined. Finally, more historical analysis of the long-term relationships between 
demographic change and different types of conflict would be helpful in understanding 
better the phenomena discussed here.
Bibliography


Further Reading List


• Austin gives here a grand overview of the consequences of low population density in Africa for economic development over the past half-millennium.


• An excellent discussion of African political demography over the course of the 20th century, with special attention to urbanization, migration and HIV/AIDS.


• This article provides micro-level evidence for the impact of high population growth on the outbreak of local conflict in contemporary western Uganda.


• This book discusses the political consequences of Africa’s dispersed population in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.
### Table 1: Sub-Saharan African Population and Ratios, 1300 – 2050
Sources: (Biraben, 1979, p. 16; United Nations, 2007)

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* Excluding ex-USSR
** UN Projection (Medium Variant)

### Table 2: Average Annual Population Growth Rates, AD 0 – 2050
Sources: same as Table 1

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<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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* Excluding ex-USSR
** UN Projection (Medium Variant)
Table 3

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Demographic change and the sources of international conflict. Jack Lexy, Ronald R. Krebs. View PDF.


The field of political demography - the politics of population change - is dramatically underrepresented in political science. At a time when demographic changes - aging in the rich world, youth bulges in the developing world, ethnic and religious shifts, migration, and urbanization - are waxing as never before, this neglect is especially glaring and starkly contrasts with the enormous interest coming from policymakers and the media.

Demographic Structure of EthnoNationalist Mobilization

Demographic Change and Conflict in Contemporary Africa

The Devil in the Demography? Religion, Identity and War in Cote d'Ivoire.