There are two distinct elements which can be used to analyse the relationship between any communist party and the USSR. Does that party assume, in however mediated a way, that the Soviet model is universally applicable? Does it also assume that the USSR has a guiding role in international affairs? The Italian Communist Party (PCI), like many other communist parties in the West, answered in the negative to the first question a long time ago, on the morrow of the last world war. The second question was more complex. For many years, at least up to the early 60s, the PCI, squeezed by the logic of Yalta, the logic of bipolarism, took its stand in the only camp it could choose: the Soviet camp. When the Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary L'Unita declared: ‘Tomorrow we may even discuss our differences. Today we must defend the Socialist Revolution. When the guns of the counter-revolutionaries are in operation one must be on one or the other side of the barricades. There is no third camp’.

Since 1956 international bipolarism has stopped being the only form of organisation of world affairs. Just as the simple model of ‘Capital versus Labour’ could not withstand the increased multiplicity of social subjects, new political subjects have begun to ‘crowd’ the international arena: non-aligned countries, oil producing cartels, Islamic revolutions, Chinese communism, Gaullist conceptions of Europe as a third force, international banks, transnational companies, international terrorism etc. Conflicts are no longer simply a matter of East versus West, the international communist movement no longer exists as ‘socialist’ countries even fight each other militarily.

Since the early 60s the PCI has taken repeated stands against the main direction of Soviet foreign policy: over Algeria, over China, over the PLO, over Sadat’s visit to Israel, over Czechoslovakia, over NATO, over the EEC, over the Horn of Africa, over Cambodia, over Afghanistan and now . . . over Poland. So what is new? After Poland shows us what is new and it is, as Eric Heffer writes in the foreword ‘a declaration of great significance for the future of socialism, both East and West’.

The book consists of the text of the resolution on Poland issued by the PCI on 29 December 1981. Berlinguer’s report to the subsequent meeting of the Central Committee, speeches by leading members of the PCI, an article by Armando Cossutta, the only member of the Executive Committee and of the Central Committee to oppose the resolution, the text of Pravda’s attack on the Italian communists (which was published in the PCI press) and the PCI’s reply to it (which, however, was not published in the Soviet press). The resolution of December 1981 contained several significant new points. It asserts that the phase of socialist development which began with the October Revolution has exhausted its driving force (p16). Even more pointedly it asserts that ‘the march forward of socialism, in the present phase depends, more and more, on democratic and socialist ideas and achievements in the capitalist developed world (particularly the countries of Western Europe) and on the success of the most progressive experiences . . . in countries of the Third World’ (p17). Thus the PCI takes stock of the new situation: the October Revolution is over. The State which resulted from it has nothing to offer to the socialist movement. This contrasts severely with Berlinguer’s remark to the party congress in 1975: ‘It is a fact: in the capitalist world there is crisis; in the socialist world there is no crisis’. Now in this document, which pitilessly defines the Polish crisis as a double crisis of economic development and democratic development, there is no longer a reference to the ‘socialist’ countries. They are now referred as ‘the countries of Eastern Europe’ or ‘the Warsaw Pact countries’.

The Soviet Union is described as being at the very least indirectly responsible for the situation in Poland. It is Soviet interference, Soviet pressure. Soviet ideological campaigns, which have rendered a compromise between Solidarity and the Warsaw authorities increasingly difficult and eventually impossible. But the Soviet Union is also responsible in a more general sense: it was not inevitable that the Yalta agreement should be interpreted as the imposition of a monolithic and Soviet model of socialism which took no account of national particularities. The power blocs must not be interpreted as ‘static and unmovable “facts of life”, ideological-military camps, governed only by philosophy of power’. Finally, the foreign policy of the USSR has no longer a necessarily progressive role: ‘This role sometimes coincides with the interests of those countries fighting against reactionary regimes and imperialism . . . some other times it clashes with these interests or even violates them openly as happened with the military intervention in Afghanistan’ (p16).

The consequence of the resolution and of all the positions taken in the last few years has also been the necessity to face the fact that the original strategy of Eurocommunism needs considerable changes. Its partial failure was due to the fact that its theoretical boundaries never coincided with the formal communist movement in the West and yet this was defined as its natural terrain. But Western communism is weak. The French CP has never been able to break with Soviet foreign policy, the Spanish CP has considerable internal problems and other CPs are either not ‘Eurocommunist’ (Portugal) or too electorally weak (Britain) or in ‘peripheral’ countries (Iceland, Finland). Thus the search for a ‘Third Way’ beyond traditional social democracy and also clearly demarcated from Soviet communism must include new and old social and political forces which owe little or nothing to the tradition created by October 1917.

Of course, it makes little sense to expect the Italian CP to offer the rest of the world the ‘Third Way’ as some sort of messianic message, producing yet another model. We all know only too well what is at stake and
what are the parameters of the 'Third Way':
the solidarity with the struggles of the Polish workers was not only dictated by the desire for democratisation, it was also compelled by the overall strategic need to go beyond Yalta and the 'logic of the blocs'. As Pietro Ingrao wrote in Rinascita in December 1981:

'I hear people say..."otherwise the USSR would have intervened". This looks like an argument full of realism. But we must be clear what it means to accept it: whether we like it or not it means to submit to an interpretation of the existing power blocs which eliminates in fact the sovereignty of the countries which are in the blocs. If this interpretation prevails it will inevitably reverberate in the West: it will prevail at home against the independence of our people, against their decisions and not only when what is at stake is the participation of Communists in the government, but when what is at stake is the installation of nuclear missiles.'

Donald Sassoon
The territorial changes of Poland immediately after World War II were very extensive, the Oder-Neisse line became Poland's western border and the Curzon Line its eastern border. In 1945, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, Poland's borders were redrawn in accordance with the decisions made first by the Allies at the Tehran Conference of 1943 where the Soviet Union demanded the recognition of the line proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1920. Poland was in ruins and there was no place for such trivial concerns. The 14 July 1945 issue of Przekroju read: For heaven's sake, ladies, see to something else! No one, after all, looks nice. Poles after the war had to constantly manoeuvre between Paris and Moscow, between the silhouettes of the West and the dies of the East, between dreams and poverty, war order and new systems, conformism and rebellion. Post-war fashion in Poland continued to fight first for its right to exist, and then over its identity.