The topic of this essay has received surprisingly little attention among students of American foreign policy. This is not because the foreign economic bureaucracy is inconsequential—though it is arguably less significant than, for example, the Department of Defense. A partial explanation, perhaps, is that scholarly interest in the foreign affairs bureaucracy in general was waning in the decades (beginning with the seventies) that a semi-autonomous US foreign economic bureaucracy was emerging. The result, in any case, is that compared to others in this volume, this contribution will focus more on the topic itself and less on how scholars have probed and interpreted it.

There are exceptions, of course. Stephen D. Cohen has provided, through five volumes of his *The Making of United States International Economic Policy* (see Cohen 2000), a comprehensive description and assessment of policymaking processes and institutions within this sphere. The current author has provided more selective analyses, with *Making Foreign Economic Policy* (Destler 1980) addressing issues of food and trade, and *The National Economic Council* (Destler 1996) centering on an important organizational innovation undertaken by the Clinton Administration. A colleague has offered a careful analysis of a longstanding Treasury Department institution, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (Henning 1999).

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Occasionally a practitioner will provide an illuminating analysis from an insider perspective: a notable example is Roger Porter’s study of the Ford Administration’s Economic Policy Board (Porter 1980), for which he served as executive director. Or a scholar will illuminate the policy process he encountered while serving in government (Niskanen 1988). Or a journalist will decide that a particular institution is important and understudied, and write a book about it, such as Steve Dryden’s *Trade Warriors*, which details the birth and life of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (Dryden 1995). Or scholars may focus on international economic bargaining processes, as Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne did concerning the Group of Seven economic policy summits (Putnam and Bayne 1984), John S. Odell on international economic bargaining more generally (Odell 2000), and Putnam concerning the interplay between foreign and domestic negotiations that he labels “two-level games.” (Putnam 1988)

There have also been good studies that illuminate policy processes by employing and testing scholarly models. Examples are Leonard Schoppa’s use of Putnam’s framework to assess of the impact of US governmental pressure on Japanese trade policies (Schoppa 1997), and Federick Mayer’s comprehensive examination of a range of models as for insights into decision making on the North American Free Trade Agreement (Mayer 1997).

But most studies have centered less on governmental institutions *per se* than on broader phenomena associated with interdependence, such as Robert Keohane’s focus on international regimes in *After Hegemony* (Keohane 1984), and the myriad influential works of Peter Katzenstein (e.g., Katzenstein 1978). These are part of a
rich literature on international political economy which has flourished for several decades. It is, strictly speaking, outside the topic of this essay, but it overlaps it at various points, as will be noted periodically in the pages that follow.

This essay will begin, therefore, with a historical account of how the United States came to have a set of institutions handling most international economic policy issues that are separate from those we associate with mainstream foreign policy: the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and the intelligence community.

The Bifurcation of American Foreign Policy

The United States emerged from World War II under leaders determined to reject isolationism and remain engaged in global affairs. Economic issues figured prominently in their thinking, and an open world economy was an important goal to them along with international geopolitical engagement. Dean Acheson reflected this view during his service as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs during the early 1940s. (Chace 1998) The National Security Act of 1947 was similarly comprehensive: it charged the National Security Council, which it created, with advising the president on “the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” (National Security Act, Sec. 101) But even before the end of World War II, action began which laid the foundations for a semi-autonomous US foreign economic bureaucracy. This was built upon four policy imperatives that were, to significant degrees, independent of national
security policy. And they generated both new institutions and new responsibilities for existing ones.

The first imperative to emerge historically was represented by the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, where officials from allied nations met to build the basis for the postwar international economy. To avoid a repeat of the economic malaise of the interwar (1919-39) period, the soon-to-be-victors in World War II, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, agreed to create two global institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now “the World Bank”). In the US implementing legislation, the Department of the Treasury was assigned the task of representing the United States at these two institutions, a responsibility which it has retained to this day, and which has been an important source of that department’s overall primacy in foreign economic policy.

The second US imperative was initially domestic—to legislate policies and institutions aimed at preventing a recurrence of the Great Depression. Encouraged by the new doctrine of Keynesian economics, the Employment Act of 1946 made it the responsibility of the federal government to “promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.” To propose policies to achieve this, the Act established a three-person Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in the Executive Office of the President, and mandated that it report annually to a Joint Economic Committee of the Congress also established in the legislation. Both institutions were just advisory, and a more potent role in achieving this objective would be played by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and its chairman. In the early
1950s, the Fed shifted the priority of its open market operations from minimizing costs of financing the federal debt to stabilizing the economy by influencing interest rates.

The Employment Act laid a marker: Americans would henceforth hold the federal government responsible for keeping the US economy running at full steam. And as globalization proceeded, this required heed to what other nations were doing as well. In January 1977, newly-inaugurated President Jimmy Carter sent his vice president on a trip to Germany and Japan, with the aim of them joining the United States as economic “locomotives” for global recovery.

The third imperative emerged initially from the postwar economic crisis in Europe. The devastation of the conflict had been compounded by a particularly cruel winter in 1947, leaving the continent on economic life support. Led by Secretary of State George Marshall and his deputy, Dean Acheson, the United States responded with the Marshall Plan. This was not only an unprecedented grant of economic aid, amounting at its height to 1.5 percent of US GDP and one-quarter the size of the US defense budget. It conditioned the provision of that aid on Europeans joining in a coordinated reconstruction effort. Abroad, this sowed the seeds of what would eventually become the European Union. For the United States, it established a new sphere of policy under the generic label of “foreign assistance.” In the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, priority shifted to the developing nations—with bilateral programs under what became the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and multilateral aid under the World Bank and the United Nations.
The fourth imperative emerged over a longer period, and would prove particularly important for the evolution of US foreign economic policymaking institutions separate from those addressing national security. This was the combination of growing US engagement in the international economy and growing economic competition from nations that were our geopolitical allies. In the early postwar period, American manufacturing had been globally dominant, and the US economy was remarkably self-contained. In 1950, the ratio of US international trade (average of imports and exports) to total domestic goods production was roughly .05. But this would rise to .09 in 1970, .20 in 1980, and .29 in 2000. (Destler 2005; US Council of Economic Advisers, various years)

Postwar economic competition came first from the uniting Europe, beginning in the late 1950s. This was followed by the extraordinary economic recovery of Japan, then the rise of East Asia generally. The political response would rise also. US producers thought it OK for international economic policy to be a handmaiden of foreign policy—as long as they were not overly affected. However, the internationalization of the US economy led logically to greater domestic concern over, and influence on, US economic transactions with the world. (On the early Congressional impact, see Pastor 1980.)

Congress had always been reluctant to allow trade policy to stray too far from US domestic interests. Three years after Bretton Woods there was a follow-on conference at Havana which crafted plans for an organization for global commerce parallel to the World Bank and the IMF: the projected International Trade Organization. This proved stillborn when Congress failed to ratify its charter. But
the “interim” organization of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) proved surprisingly effective in establishing rules within its sphere over the first fifty years after World War II, until at last the World Trade Organization (WTO) opened its doors in January 1995.

The rejection of a new international trade institution was followed, in due course, by creation of a new domestic one. The trigger was President John F. Kennedy’s proposal for a constructive response to Europe’s new economic challenge. Central to his “Declaration of Interdependence” was an initiative for the most ambitious international negotiation yet undertaken to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade. So he went to Capitol Hill seeking an expanded version of the authority Congress had intermittently granted Presidents since the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 under Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Legislators were reluctant to grant this authority if State Department officials continued to lead such negotiations, as they had done since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934—they were competent enough, said House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark), but they didn’t understand US industry and were not sensitive to its needs. Department of Commerce officials, on the other hand, knew US industry but were not (in Mills’s view) all that competent, and they didn’t know agriculture. We needed to have negotiators who would understand and balance all these interests.

So Kennedy agreed, reluctantly, to creation of a “special representative for trade negotiations” in the Executive Office of the President to lead and coordinate the negotiations. “STR,” as it was known, proved successful not just in completing
the Kennedy Round in 1967, but in working with Congress to develop comprehensive new trade legislation in 1973-74 and in successfully negotiating the Tokyo Round agreements of 1979. Legislators responded by giving it increased support and authority. When President Nixon sought to subsume STR within a broader White House entity, Congress responded by making it a Cabinet-level statutory agency (previously only its head was enshrined in statute). In 1980 STR became “USTR,” the Office of the United States Trade Representative, with enhanced staff and authority.

Trade was arguably the most important element of foreign economic policy, but far from the only one, and there was a perceived need to coordinate US international economic programs and activities with one another—and with related economic and foreign policy actions. Initially this was the province of the National Security Council (NSC) created in 1947. And through the 1960s, this NSC role included foreign economic policies. In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, for example, foreign economics came under the purview of a deputy national security adviser (whose portfolio also included US-European relations). Francis M. Bator, who held this position under Lyndon Johnson, has provided a brilliant description and analysis of this process. (US House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1972)

But Nixon did not follow this practice, and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, gave short shrift to these issues. The result was a policy vacuum that was filled formally (but not effectively) by a new Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), established first by executive order in 1971 and later by statute.
CIEP never established comprehensive authority, however, and went out of existence in 1977. In practice, the lead was taken initially by Secretary of the Treasury John Connally in 1971, then by a cabinet-level Council on Economic Policy (CEP) chaired by his successor, George Shultz, beginning in 1972. Symbolic was the fact that when Nixon made his epochal decision to abandon the dollar’s link to gold in August 1971, the advisory group that gathered at Camp David included no one from either the NSC or the Department of State. (Gowa 1983; Odell 1982)

The Nixon administration was *sui generis*, but on this matter its successors followed Nixon’s lead, assigning staff responsibility for international economic policy in general to White House-based coordinating entities separate from the National Security Council. They followed the CEP precedent, though most changed the label. President Gerald Ford employed the highly effective Economic Policy Board (Porter 1980). Carter replaced it with a less formal, and less effective, Economic Policy Group (Destler 1980). In Reagan’s second term, it was the Economic Policy Council under his strong treasury secretary, James Baker, which continued President George H. W. Bush. All of these were formally, Cabinet-level committees chaired by Treasury (or, in some instances, the president). A few, like Ford’s EPB, had capable, engaged staff support. (Destler 1996; Porter 1983)

It was Bill Clinton, however, who made organizing for international economic policy a campaign issue—and a prominent presidential initiative. George Bush (the elder) had presided over the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. But the United States was losing out economically even as it was triumphing geopolitically, Clinton asserted. (Critics put it succinctly: “The Cold War is over:
Japan won!”) And Clinton contrasted Bush’s smooth, collegial NSC with his fractious group of economic advisers. If elected, the Arkansan would create an “Economic Security Council (ESC).” The aim, he told campaign aide Gene Sperling, was to create a process for economics comparable to what Bush had developed for national security. And the international side of economic policy was prominent in the Arkansan’s thinking.

Once elected, Clinton signaled his priority to “the economy, stupid,” by ostentatiously delaying returns of congratulatory phone calls from foreign leaders and, more consequentially, announcing his economic advisory team, as a group, several days prior to the press conference where he revealed his chief national security appointments. Prominent among the former was Robert Rubin, who would fill the new post of Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and head of the National Economic Council (NEC). This name was thought less confrontational, internationally, than “Economic Security Council,” and its focus was domestic as much as international. But both institutionally and practically it highlighted the economic policy links between the two, and diluted somewhat the links between international economic policy and national security. (Destler 1996; Juster and Lazarus 1996) It was the culmination of a trend toward a “separate but equal” framework for the economic side of US international relations. The NEC was established by executive order, not statute, but it had a substantial, independent staff. And contrary to prior practice, Clinton’s two immediate successors kept the NEC name and the economic adviser position.
Hence, beginning in the early sixties, accelerating from the seventies onward, there emerged a distinct segment of the US government, separate from the NSC and the key foreign policy agencies, that takes the major decisions and actions on foreign economic policy. To some degree, this has been the product of formal presidential orders. To a greater degree, it has been driven by the exigencies of daily policymaking and the pressures—particularly domestic—that drive it. It is appropriate to label this grouping of agencies “the economic complex.” (Destler 1994)

Most of the agencies that comprise the economic complex do not give automatic priority to the international side of US economic policy. Indeed, a distinguishing characteristic is that they tend to view issues within the framework of overall US economic policy and US economic interests rather than that of foreign policy. Typical is what Cohen labels the “institutional superpower in the economic policymaking process,” the Department of the Treasury (Cohen 2000).

*The (Foreign) Economic Agencies*

Treasury is, above all, an institution centered on finance—creation and maintenance of the currency, the US dollar. As set forth on the department’s website, “Whether it is regulating national banks, determining international economic policy, collecting income and excise taxes, issuing securities, reporting the government’s daily financial transactions, or manufacturing coins or bills for circulation, the one concern that still ties together the activities of the Department of the Treasury is money.” (US Treasury 2010, at education/history/brochure
Central here is the department’s primary US government authority over taxation—though (unlike finance ministry counterparts abroad) it does not oversee government spending.

Both Treasury’s stances on international issues and its credibility in addressing them are shaped by its domestic policy base. Until the late 1980s, this relationship was embodied in the position of Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, held prominently in the early seventies by Paul Volcker. Today, that job is split between domestic and international finance, and Treasury has three presidential appointees with specifically international responsibilities—the Under Secretary for International Affairs, an Assistant Secretary for International Finance, and an Assistant Secretary for International Markets and Development.

Supporting them is an Office of International Affairs (OIA) numbering well over a hundred professionals organized into twelve units. Six are regional: Africa; East Asia; Europe and Eurasia; Middle East and North Asia; South and Southeast Asia; and Western Hemisphere. The others handle cross-cutting substantive issues or specific operational responsibilities: Development Policy and Debt; Environment and Energy; International Monetary and Financial Policy; Investment Security; Technical Assistance; and Trade and Investment Policy. On some of these, Treasury is a subordinate actor, a policy kibitzer: trade, environment, and energy come to mind. But on others, it can be dominant indeed. For example, it has direct statutory responsibility for representing the United States at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and for staffing US relations with these key international organization. And while most OIA officials are based in Washington, a
significant number are posted overseas—a recent count listed 40 countries with
which the department has technical assistance agreements.

Foremost for Treasury is the matter of exchange rate policy, a responsibility
which the department shares with the Federal Reserve and jealously guards
against potential intruders, even White House officials. (Destler and Henning 1989;
Volcker and Gyoten 1992) The most prominent case came in 1985, when Secretary
of the Treasury James Baker III maneuvered stealthily in Washington to set the
stage for the September Plaza agreement in which the Group of Five industrial
nations took concerted action to bring down the over-valued dollar. (Funabashi
1988) Baker took care never to convene an interagency meeting on the topic, first
keeping his plans secret, then meeting with senior colleagues one-on-one to win
their acquiescence.

Treasury dominance has been almost as great on matters of LDC debt. The
Mexican crisis caught Robert Rubin in transition from the position of NEC director
to that of Treasury Secretary, but he quickly dominated decision making on the US
response, working with his Deputy Secretary, Larry Summers. After encountering
Congressional resistance, they were able to act independently by use of a
Treasury-controlled institution, the Exchange Stabilization Fund. (Henning 1999)
Rubin and Summers also dominated the US response to the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997, and their failure to come to Thailand’s aid generated criticism that
they had given short shrift to US geopolitical interests. And when a full-blown
American financial crisis emerged in 2008, and spread to other advanced nations,
the international response was determined by Bush’s Treasury Secretary, Henry
Paulson, working again in tandem with Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner of the Fed. They were, inevitably, the point persons in measures to keep the Great Recession from becoming a second Great Depression, particularly because banks and “non-bank” financial institutions were at the center of the crisis. This lead department role continued into the Obama administration, with Geithner becoming Treasury Secretary and (together with Obama) leading the US at a series of Group of 20 international economic summits.

As these examples show, Treasury’s international economic policy leadership has been enhanced by the persistent presidential practice of naming the Treasury Secretary the administration’s senior economic official. And when the occupant of this office is not, in fact, playing this role, he may soon find himself out of a job. Nixon brought John Connally up from Texas to replace David Kennedy in 1971; Carter fired W. Michael Blumenthal in 1979, somehow persuading G. William Miller to step down as Fed chairman to serve in his stead.

Treasury’s general stance on international economic issues finds frequent support from two other broad economic policy agencies located in the Executive Office of the President. One, whose origins were addressed earlier, is the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), created in 1946 to help the United States avoid a new depression. It is a three-person body charged with providing the president with professional economic advice (with ten or so supporting staff economists). It also provides the underlying macroeconomic analysis that each administration requires to make its budget projections. It also represents the United States on the macroeconomic policy coordinating committee of the Organizational for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the international organization of the advanced economies.

Since CEA has no operating responsibilities, its influence waxes and wanes. The Council tends to have impact to the degree that (1) the President cares about and focuses on economic policy; (2) the CEA chair develops an effective relationship with him; and (3) there exists a structured policy process giving CEA economists relevant targets for their lucid policy memos. Trade policy often has this characteristic. So do major policy issues (e.g., the shape of basic economic policy) that tend to arise early in an administration. Obama’s first CEA chair, Cristina Romer, had expertise concerning US macroeconomic policy in the 1930s that proved highly appropriate to the challenge of 2009. (On the CEA historically, see Hargrove and Morley 1984, and Stein 1994. On 2009, see Destler 2010.)

However, CEA’s institutional monopoly within the White House ended with the creation of the National Economic Council in 1993. With it came a “National Economic Adviser” whose broad policy leadership role typically places him (or her) above the CEA chair in the White House staff pecking order. If this aide gives priority to policy advocacy over policy process management, this can put the CEA chair in the shade. Clinton’s first CEA head, Laura Tyson, perceived this threat clearly and negotiated a division of labor with Robert Rubin. They appear to have coexisted effectively, and Tyson in fact succeeded Rubin at NEC when he became Secretary of the Treasury. Romer seems to have had greater difficulty working out such a relationship. Her NEC counterpart, Larry Summers, was less a man of process than Rubin, and a formidable substantive economist to boot. So the role
conflict was more direct, and Romer—with less access to the President—resigned after 18 months in office.

More important than CEA in overall policymaking is the far larger Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the core institutional staff in the Executive Office of the President. Its oversight role in government spending gives its head broad influence over policy—though, even more than CEA, it is centered on the domestic side. OMB’s international policy influence depends on the degree to which a specific sphere is budget-dependent. Thus its “examiners” have significant influence over foreign assistance policy. Gordon Adams, once OMB’s Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, has written the definitive analysis of the foreign affairs budget process. (Adams and Williams 2010)

Together, the Treasury Secretary, the OMB Director, and the CEA chair form the “troika.” This group has typically met weekly for a frank discussion of current economic issues, receiving analytic support from subgroups at lower levels. Here, as elsewhere, Treasury has the lead.

If Treasury has steadily gained in foreign economic policy power, the agency that has receded has been the Department of State. Prior to World War II, the diplomatic agency had the clear lead in this sphere. But its position has shrunk steadily as the domestic importance of the policy has grown. State continues to deploy “economic officers” in its foreign service to posts around the world. The department has the cabinet-level lead on bilateral foreign assistance, particularly through its oversight over the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Its Bureau of International Organization Affairs represents US interests concerning
the substantial foreign assistance programs of the UN specialized agencies. Otherwise, aside from a few limited issues like international aviation policy, Foggy Bottom no longer has the foreign economic lead.

The Secretary of State has an important voice when she chooses to raise it on any specific issue, and she is supported by an Under Secretary and an Assistant Secretary within the economic sphere. Their subordinates, housed mainly in the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB), hold important places at a range of Washington policy tables, from trade to energy to environment. But rarely do they sit in the chair.

Most notable has been the shrinkage of State Department power over international trade. And here, it has lost out not to Treasury, but to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).

From the early republic through the 1950s, it was State Department officials who negotiated trade agreements for the United States. Secretary of State Cordell Hull personally led the historic transformation of US trade policy from high tariff protection to growing market liberalization, through enactment of reciprocal trade legislation beginning in 1934. In the final years of the Eisenhower administration, Douglas Dillon was the de facto leader of US foreign economic policy, operating from his position as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In fact, a GATT trade negotiation, the “Dillon Round,” bears his name.

But as set forth in the historical account above, Congress—backed by US business—forced a change. Initially this was limited to multilateral negotiations—the President's “special representative for trade negotiations,” Christian Herter
and then William Roth, had only a small staff and worked closely with officials at State and other departments in negotiating the Kennedy Round in 1962-67. But gradually it expanded, until today’s USTR holds center stage across a broad range of bilateral and global trade issues.

Its enhancement came in stages, and mainly in response to Congressional pressure. Legislators responded to Nixon administration efforts to subsume the office within a broader White House coordinating entity by making STR a statutory entity (earlier law had just done so for the trade representative as an individual). Russell Long, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, added the flourish of giving its head cabinet status by mandating a cabinet-level salary. All of this was accomplished through the Trade Act of 1974. Jimmy Carter’s appointee, Robert S. Strauss, demonstrated the potential of the position by dominating the Tokyo Round trade negotiation in 1977-79 (while responding assiduously to his interlocutors on the Congressional committees, particularly Senate Finance). But Senators wanted the trade bureaucracy buttressed for the longer term, and held up final action on the Tokyo Round implementing legislation in July 1979 until the administration submitted a specific trade reorganization proposal.

This reorganization plan, approved by Congress, renamed the office USTR, as earlier noted. It also expanded its authority to broad “international trade policy development, coordination, and negotiation,” including relations with GATT, bilateral issues, East-West trade, and commodity matters. Congress gave USTR additional authority in trade legislation enacted in 1984 and 1988.
The trade office’s central role was further underscored by trade process legislation. In successive trade laws, Congress placed the trade representative at the head of several layers of interagency coordinating committees. (Today, under the National Economic Council, USTR chairs the Trade Policy Review Group and the Trade Policy Staff Committee, and as such “is responsible for convening the twenty agencies” that are members [US Trade Representative 2010, “about-us/interagency-role”].) USTR is also mandated to oversee—and respond to—an elaborate network of private sector advisory committees: twenty-eight in all, some representing sectors (e.g., steel, textiles and clothing), others types of business (e.g., small and minority enterprises), still others cross-cutting issues (e.g., intellectual property). These committees, which seeming constrain the agency, often provide it leverage. As set forth in one prescient analysis of the Tokyo Round, “The same [advisory group] system that organized the sectoral interests. . . .also structured the task of the executive in dealing with those interests. . . .channels of access could be two-way streets: access to the executive by the private sector could also mean access to the private sector by the executive.” (Winham 1986, pp. 315-17)

On the other hand, USTR’s location in the Executive Office of the President has proved to be a mixed blessing. The original rationale was that it needed to balance the interests—international and domestic, industrial and agricultural—that were represented in the departments. This retains validity. The White House location was also supposed to give it power. But this has proved, ironically, more attractive to USTR’s Congressional counterparts (the House Committee on Ways and Means;
the Senate Committee on Finance) than it has to presidents and their senior advisers. Political scientist Richard E. Neustadt warned John F. Kennedy against “proliferating advisory staffs in your Executive Office,” and presidents before and since have been reluctant to have the currency of the White House spent on activities in which they are not centrally, personally involved. (Neustadt 1960) As earlier noted, JFK accepted the special trade representative because he had to, in order to obtain the sweeping negotiating authority he sought, and Nixon sought to bury the office with a broader White House entity in 1973.

But the story did not end there. In negotiations surrounding the appointment of Malcolm Baldrige as Secretary of Commerce, Ronald Reagan promised him that he—not USTR Bill Brock—would lead trade policy within his administration. And in 1983, despite overwhelming opposition within his cabinet, Reagan endorsed a Senate bill that would have subsumed USTR within a new Department of Commerce and Trade. Again, Congressional trade leaders came to the rescue, and the bill did not come to a floor vote in either chamber. But as recently as 2000, members of incoming president George W. Bush’s transition team signaled that they were thinking of taking away USTR’s cabinet status. This idea died when business and congressional opposition quickly emerged. But it demonstrated, once again, that USTR’s ultimate power rests not so much in the presidency as in its allies on Capitol Hill.

USTR’s influence was also dependent on having major trade negotiations to lead. Strauss demonstrated the positive potential during the Tokyo Round. His very different but equally talented Reagan administration successor, Bill Brock
(1981-85), was weakened not just by the Baldrige challenge, but by the fact that the United States was between major trade negotiations—free trade talks with Canada were not launched until 1985, and the Uruguay Round was not authorized until 1986. Ron Kirk was weakened by Barack Obama’s initial deferral of serious trade issues. Conversely, USTR Carla Hills’ central role under George H.W. Bush was solidified by not just that ongoing trade round but also the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) negotiations. And trade representative Robert Zoellick, who served George W. Bush from 2001 to 2005, was able to overcome none-too-close relations with both the president and Congress through his aggressive and successful pursuit of a series of bilateral free trade agreement.

Within the executive branch, the most potent potential challenger to USTR has not been the State Department, and not even the wide-ranging Treasury, but the much-maligned Department of Commerce.

The first challenge came in 1969, in the wake of the Kennedy Round. Seizing control of the negotiation President Nixon most cared about, the effort to get Japan to restrain its textile sales to the US market, Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans gained temporary primacy—partly through engineering the appointment of a weak and vulnerable man as STR. (Destler et al 1979) He failed to maintain the lead when he was unable to win Japanese agreement, and STR’s strength was restored by new appointments two years later. (Destler 1980; Dryden 1995) But Baldrige posed a more serious challenge in the first Reagan administration. And he was buttressed by new authorities given the Commerce Department in the reorganization of 1979-80.
Members of Congress had, in general, supported the free-trade proclivities of successive administrations. But they wanted industries and workers hurt by trade to have access to remedies, particularly if the foreign competition was perceived to be “unfair.” The GATT allowed a nation to impose “countervailing duties” (CVDs) on goods whose production or trade were subsidized by foreign governments, and “anti-dumping (AD) duties” on goods that were sold at “less than fair value.” Up to 1980, the US government had employed such devices sparingly, even after Congress devoted an entire title of the Trade Act of 1974 to “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices.” The reason, legislators widely believed, was that the responsibility for CVD and dumping cases was housed in the Department of the Treasury. The key trade committees made it clear, even as they approved the Tokyo Round agreements, that they wanted that authority moved to a more petitioner-friendly agency.

The Carter administration had to acquiesce, and it moved responsibility for “unfair trade cases” to the Department of Commerce. It also declared Commerce, more generally, to be “the focus of nonagricultural operational trade responsibilities.” Included was jurisdiction over commercial attaches posted to US embassies, an authority formerly held by State and now exercised by the US and Foreign Commercial Service. The Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade presides over this and a broad range of trade-related department activities—including export promotion and AD/CVD administration—housed in the International Trade Administration.
The logic of the USTR-Commerce division of labor is that the former will lead and the latter will follow—or at least operate within the overall USTR-established framework of policy and operations. But Commerce has enough specific authorities to challenge for overall trade policy leadership is the Secretary so desires. And since the remainder of his department is largely semi-autonomous technical offices like the Census Bureau and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the secretary has no other such opportunity.

Other departments play international economic policy roles linked to their overall missions. The Department of Agriculture has retained primacy on trade issues involving farm products. The Department of Labor manages the Trade Adjustment Assistance program providing aid to workers displaced by imports. The Department of Energy plays a substantial role in international issues relating to oil.

Finally, there is a trade-regulatory and fact-finding agency: the United States International Trade Commission (USITC), created by Congress in 1975 as successor to the US Tariff Commission. With six commissioners divided between the political parties, serving overlapping terms of nine years, it is designed to be insulated from political influence. It provides independent analysis—in particular concerning whether industries seeking trade relief (e.g., in AD or CVD cases) are being injured by imports. USITC also does analyses of particular industries, and of the potential impact of projected trade agreements.

Atop all these agencies sits the president and his National Economic Council. But even when the national economic adviser gives priority to managing the policy
process, and the president lends his support, the overall process is considerably less centralized than that for international security policy. One key reason is that that fewer issues come to the president for decision on a regular basis.

International finance is dominated by Treasury and the Federal Reserve, running a closed policy process. Trade is more open to interagency participation, and to the influence of actors outside government, but presidents typically like most such issues addressed at some remove from them, lest they be forced to make unpopular choices among interests and constituencies. Members of Congress insist on overall oversight, including the occasional enactment of comprehensive legislation, but (like presidents) are often happy to see the hot issues resolved elsewhere. This gives leeway, and influence, to the myriad elements of the foreign economic bureaucracy.

Finally, while a separate “economic complex” has risen to pursue foreign economic policy not subservient to broad US foreign policy and national security concerns, it would be wrong to deny the impact of such concerns in many specific cases. In particular, when US economic interests are less than overwhelming, other influences find their way in. The State Department plays a central role, for example, in whether to impose US economic sanctions on Burma or Sudan. And countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain were not chosen as partners for US free-trade agreements mainly for the economic gains to be had.

How much does all this matter? Granted the existence of the substantial American foreign economic bureaucracy, described herein in sometimes-minute detail, how much impact does it have on policy, and on actual world events? Forty
years ago, Graham Allison (1971) published his landmark study of the US policy process as it operated on political-military issues, *Essence of Decision*. Three years later came Morton H. Halperin’s *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974). The thrust of both was that the activities and interests of diverse institutions and actors spread through the foreign affairs government had substantial, under-appreciated impact on US policy. Critics were soon to question this, arguing that the President was in fact dominant when he wanted to be. (Krasner 1972; Art 1973) Perhaps, they concluded, the much-ballyhooed “bureaucratic politics” approach to US foreign policy was, in fact, much ado about not much.

A somewhat similar minimization of institutional influences emerged in scholarly dialogues about foreign economic policy. Here, however, the dominant actor was perceived to be not the president but “society,” and specifically the array of private economic actors that increasingly constrained official decisions. Faced with these pressures, the state was “weak.” (Krasner 1977) Buffeted by interest group pressures, government leaders had difficulty fashioning coherent policies, and seemed increasingly to succumb to protectionism as a result.

And yet, somehow, the American economy stayed open, and US global leadership on trade policy was sustained for decades after this critique was published. How could this be? Counter-explanations arose. A group of international political economy scholars noted, drawing on a century of cases, that the demise of the American state was, at minimum, exaggerated. (Ikenberry et al 1988). For them, “The shaping and constraining role of state officials and the
institutions they inhabit” remained “considerable,” for “the interests and capabilities of groups and individuals are mediated by the institutional structures within which they operate.” (For a related analysis, see Evans et al 1985.) Other scholars, working within the “rational choice” tradition, sometimes referred to as the “new institutionalism,” saw US policy in general as subject to “Congressional dominance,” with the bureaucracy merely the “agent” of Congressmen responding to their own political interests, re-election in particular. (McCubbins et al, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987) One scholar applied a nuanced version of this approach to US trade policy. (O’Halloran 1994) This author’s analysis has argued that, in an environment where legislators have multiple interests (including blame avoidance), purposive executive officials can navigate effectively within an eclectic legislative/interest group environment, avoid direct Congressional dominance, and maintain the free-trade orientation of US trade policy. (Destler 2005) Another scholar found that for the US International Trade Commission, Congressional influence was present but “not as important as other factors” in explaining its actions. (DeVault 2002)

**Conclusion**

There is a set of US offices and agencies, separate from the National Security Council and the Department of State, that constitute a foreign economic bureaucracy or (this author’s earlier phrase) and “economic complex.” It has grown in response to the impact of globalization on the American economy.
Scholarly study of these institutions has been significant but limited. Individual analysts have tended to view them through their own particular analytic lenses, international political economy; rational choice. This essay has therefore centered on analytic description of the foreign economic bureaucracy and how it has evolved.

REFERENCES


Krasner, Stephen D. 1972. “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland).” Foreign Policy 7 (Summer), pp. 159-79.


The analysis reveals evidence of conditional convergence in the enlarged EU, with investment share, foreign direct investment, human capital, and country openness appearing as robust growth drivers. In contrast, inflation and government consumption rather hamper growth. Furthermore, the effects of corruption and bureaucracy on growth seem to differ across old and new EU members.